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Across Political Fault Lines:
An Integrative Review
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We revisit the construct of political polarization and current distinctions between issue-
driven and affective polarization. Based on our review of recent research on polarization
from psychology, political science, and communication, we propose to treat polarization
as a process that integrates the concepts of social identification (collective self-definition)
with ideologically opposed camps - that is, psychological groups based on support
or opposition to specific socio-political issues and policies (related to issue-driven
polarization), and that of ideological and psychological distancing between groups
(related to affective polarization). Furthermore, we discuss the foundations of polarizing
groups – and more specifically, the role of conflicting collective narratives about social
reality in providing an initial platform for polarization in a technologically networked world.
In particular, we highlight the importance of online media in facilitating and enhancing
polarization between ideologically opposed camps. As a theoretical contribution, the
review provides a more functional conceptualization of polarization that can explain how
polarization may occur across partisan fault lines and in domains outside of politics.
We conclude with a discussion of new pathways to the study of polarization which this
integrative conceptualization opens.
Keywords: issue driven polarization, affective polarization, ideologically opposed camps, collective narrative,
intergroup conflict, social identity
INTRODUCTION
Advances in modern communication technology have enabled wider access and reach across
some of the most culturally and geographically remote regions in the world, therefore creating
unprecedented opportunities for cooperation that bridges cultural, economic, and geo-political
boundaries. However, despite these possibilities, modern societies seem more fragmented and
polarized than ever before (McCoy et al., 2018; McCoy and Somer, 2019). This paradox can partly
be explained by the anxieties brought on by rapid societal changes, looming economic uncertainty,
and existential threats (all significantly compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic). These factors
undoubtedly contribute to the highly polarized world we now live in - in particular, by making
people more inclined to interpret disruptions, challenges, and conflicts in society through an
“us versus them” lens. In the recent literature on polarization, there is a tendency to approach
polarization as being either issue-driven (i.e., ideological divisions in society driven by differing
policy positions, see Duffy et al., 2019) or affective (manifested as distrust and intense dislike of the
outgroup, Levendusky, 2018; Abramowitz and McCoy, 2019; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019).
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Going beyond this distinction, but building on these current
approaches to polarization, we focus on the foundational
elements of polarization – those aspects that provide the bases
of both issue-driven and affective polarization. By concentrating
on the social psychological roots of polarization in the context
of a rapidly changing society, we seek to provide an updated
conceptualization of polarization that integrates ideas from
various disciplinary domains studying polarization and also takes
into account the implications of recent technological advances in
human communication. To achieve this aim, we review research
from social and political psychology, political science, and
communication and media studies. Based on our interpretation
of this literature, we propose that intergroup polarization can be
better understood by addressing three interrelated questions:
(a) When does polarization occur?
(b) Why do particular groups polarize?
(c) How does polarization occur in modern society –
given the affordances of rapidly evolving communication
technology?
Our review is structured around potential answers to these
questions. Specifically, we propose that intergroup polarization
is most likely to occur when there is an ideological conflict
which divides a society. Such conflicts lead to the development
of alternative narratives about social reality (often mutually
exclusive) which, in turn may provide the bases for group
formation. We turn next to the ‘us versus them’ divide and
specifically, we discuss how we can best conceptualize the
intergroup dynamics that underpin polarization. Specifically,
we believe that polarization occurs between groups based on
collectively shared support for a particular narrative about social
reality (they are driven by intragroup consensus) and which
are in opposition to an alternative (conflicting) narrative (they
are energized by intergroup dissent). We refer to these groups
as ‘ideologically opposed camps’ (Bliuc et al., 2020b, 2021), a
concept that applies to polarization in the political domain that
transcends traditional partisan boundaries (e.g., Brexit) as well
as to polarization in other areas of society (e.g., divides on
vaccination, animal rights, and climate change). Polarization can
be seen as enabled and boosted by social interaction between
both people from the same group (intragroup interaction)
and people from opposing groups (intergroup interaction).
Nowadays, online social interaction increasingly determines both
the ways in which polarization occurs and its pace. Therefore,
we review recent research on the enabling and amplifying role
of online communication in polarization in intragroup and
intergroup contexts.
STRUCTURE OF THE REVIEW
We start by revisiting conceptualizations of polarization in
social psychology, political science, and other relevant fields, and
building on these we propose a working (integrative) definition
of polarization that we use in the context of this review. Then,
we review recent research on polarization between groups in
the context of socio-political issues which are relevant to large
segments of population. We first discuss key research that
distinguishes between issue-driven and affective polarization; this
section is followed by a discussion of emerging research that
treats polarization as a process that is both issue-driven and
affective, in groups that are ideologically opposed. We include
a discussion about the basis of ideologically opposed camps and
the role of collective narratives about social reality as providing
the foundations of these groups, and (implicitly) the bases for
polarization to occur. We complete the review by discussing
the role of online communication in facilitating and boosting
polarization between ideologically opposed camps. We conclude
by identifying directions for future research derived from the new
integrative treatment of polarization that we propose.
DEFINING POLARIZATION
In social psychology, polarization is traditionally conceptualized
as an intra-group process involving deliberation between group
members which results in a shift in the group position
to become more extreme – that is, after discussions, the
positions of group members become more extreme (Moscovici
and Zavalloni, 1969). In the social identity approach, and
particularly, self-categorization theory (SCT, Turner et al., 1987),
the intergroup context is introduced as an essential dimension
of polarization. That is, SCT explains this type of polarization
through conformity to a group norm that is inferred and
accentuated through reference to relevant outgroups (Turner
et al., 1989; Hogg et al., 1990; see also the concept of referent
informational influence, Turner et al., 1987; Abrams et al., 1990).
In more recent developments of the social identity approach such
as the interactive model of social identity formation (Postmes
et al., 2005a,b), group norms develop through both inductive
and deductive pathways: a social identity with its associated
normative content can be induced through communication
between ingroup members, but at the same time, it can be
deduced from the broader context and in relation to relevant
outgroup(s). Within the group, polarization may occur through
intragroup interaction which in turn leads to ‘consensualisation’
(i.e., enhanced ingroup stereotype consensus); however, even
within the group, polarization occurs in a broader intergroup
context where the outgroup is salient (Haslam et al., 1998).
Building on these ideas, we propose that consensus about
collective narratives (shared cognitions and perspectives about
the social reality) may provide a platform for inductive identity
formation and development. At the same time, intergroup
dissent - occurring when ingroup and outgroup hold conflicting
collective narratives – may provide conditions for deductive
identity content development. We argue that polarization is most
likely to occur in groups which are based on consensus about a
particular collective narrative about social reality and are defined
in opposition to an alternative collective narrative, that is in
ideologically opposed camps (Bliuc et al., 2020b; see also, Bliuc
et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009). In the context of this paper,
we adopt a broad definition of ideology as “a set of beliefs about
the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson
and Tedin, 2003; p. 64).
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In such groups, where exclusive identities are constructed
(Goodwin, 2004; Della Porta, 2018), commitment to group
position can be represented on an ideological bi-modal
continuum, with extreme positions clustering at the end of this
continuum – as for example in the cases of polarization between
climate change deniers and climate change believers (McCright
and Dunlap, 2011; Bliuc et al., 2015; Häussler, 2018), and between
supporters of Leave and Remain campaigns in the context of
Brexit (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Hobolt et al.,
2020).
A key merit of the social identity approach to polarization is
that it recognizes the roles of both intragroup and intergroup
contexts – that is, polarization is a process that occurs within the
group, but is enabled and enhanced by intergroup interaction.
However, more recent definitions (in particular, from political
science) tend to focus primarily on the intergroup dimensions
of polarization, as for instance in conceptualizations of political
polarization as “both the expanded ideological gap between
political groups and the increased interpersonal separation
between supporters of opposite parties” (Harel et al., 2020). When
strictly applied to partisan polarization (in particular, in the
political science literature), it may refer to shifts in individual
positions, but still in strictly intergroup terms, in the sense
of liberals becoming more liberal, and conservatives becoming
more conservative (Levendusky, 2009), in a bi-polar fashion. In
the social identity approach, this bi-polarity is at least partially
explained through a principle known as comparative fit (Turner,
1985; Haslam et al., 1999), according to which groups (and their
content) are defined by their extent of similarity/dissimilarity to
other groups. That is, according to the intergroup differentiation
principle, people self-categorize into groups based on how
different they are and are naturally drawn to groups that have
the most differences between them in that context (Haslam
et al., 1999), a tendency that lends itself well to agent-based
modeling tests (e.g., Mäs and Flache, 2013). For example, in a
gathering of Americans, people could choose to self-categorize
into the difference on gender, race, food preferences, or political
beliefs, but they will likely choose the group which has the
largest difference in that context within that gathering. In that
example, a person in this gathering may choose political belief
as their metric for self-categorization into a group, as the
difference between political beliefs is far larger psychological
than the difference between food preferences. This principle
also suggests that once self-categorized, individuals (and groups)
do what they can to create greater distinctions between their
group and other groups (Jetten et al., 1998; Ellemers et al.,
1999), thereby defining the group by what separates it from
the “outgroup” in the process. Therefore, from this perspective,
polarization applied to the political domain almost always occurs
in a bi-polar fashion because it is a function of groups trying to
distinguish themselves as much as possible from the outgroup
(i.e., intergroup differentiation).
In line with the social identity approach, we see polarization
as extremitisation of ingroup position (occurring through
intragroup interaction and consensualisation) providing an
intragroup consensus driven pathway (mostly inductive).
However, integrating conceptualizations of polarization
predominantly from the political domain, we also see
polarization as increased distancing from the outgroup
(represented by an ideologically opposed camp). These
conceptualizations suggest that (intergroup) polarization
can result from increasing intergroup differentiation, via a
intergroup dissent driven pathway (mostly deductive) – where
polarizing norms are likely deduced from the intergroup context.
From this perspective, polarization is a process underpinned by
identification with opposed camps in contexts where alternative
collective narratives about social reality exists; it manifests in
both ideological and psychological outcomes as distancing
between ingroup and outgroup in terms of group beliefs, norms,
and affective responses (as the social identity content of opposed
camps shifts toward stronger ingroup stereotype and further
away from the outgroup’s).
The political science literature on polarization distinguishes
between affective polarization and issue-based polarization (or
polarization driven by policy preferences, see Iyengar et al., 2012;
Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Conceptually,
the construct of affective polarization is derived from social
identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982) and its
ingroup-outgroup distinctions; applied to the United States
partisan politics, refers to the tendency of Democrats and
Republicans to dislike and distrust each other when political
identities are salient (Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Zoizner
et al., 2020). It incorporates the idea of ‘principled dislike toward
the outgroup’ (Iyengar et al., 2012). Outgroup hate is not an
inherent outcome of group identification (‘ingroup love’); there
are many contexts where ingroup favoritism exists, but it is not
systematically correlated to outgroup hostility (Brewer, 1999;
see also Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Hinkle and Brown,
1990). However, treating polarization as a negative outcome
of group identification makes theoretical sense if we consider
that (ideological) intergroup conflict forms the bases of social
identities prone to polarization as well as the existence of both
perceived realistic threat (competition over political power) and
symbolic threat (competition over beliefs and norms) (Stephan
and Stephan, 1996, 2001).
Issue-based polarization on the other hand refers to the bi-
modal clustering of positions on important policy or social
issues (Duffy et al., 2019). However, by treating polarization as
a process of ideological and psychological distancing between
ideologically opposed camps, we can conceptually integrate the
constructs of issue-driven and affective polarization. That is,
ideologically opposed camps are psychological groups which
are issue-driven (when ingroups and outgroups are shaped by
citizens’ issue positions as in issue driven polarization). However,
as psychological groups, they entail the intergroup dynamics
of ingroup favoritism, and increased antipathy and hostility
toward the outgroup (as in affective polarization). In other
words, in these groups, polarization can be seen as issue-driven
and manifesting as affective polarization (leading to outcomes
described as affective polarization, including intense distrust and
hostility toward the opposing group).
Recent conceptual developments aiming to explain political
polarization primarily in the context of the United States politics,
introduce the construct of ‘political sectarianism’ defined as “the
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FIGURE 1 | Polarization, represented as a process initiated by the existence of conflicting narratives about social reality (ideological conflict), underpinned by division
between members of opposed camps, and manifested as ideological and psychological distancing from the outgroup. Radicalization could occur as a result of
further extremization of group narratives.
tendency to adopt a moralized identification with one political
group and against another” (Finkel et al., 2020, p. 533). The
basis of this type of identification is similarity in terms of “(. . .)
faith in the moral correctness and superiority of one’s sect” (p.
533). While this construct was developed in relation to political
partisanship, a similar process of moralized identification can
occur beyond political parties – in particular, in groups which
are based on shared collective narratives about social reality (or
opposing ideological camps). For example, the dynamics between
non-politically affiliated groups such as pro-life and pro-choice
can be seen as driven to a large extent by beliefs of moral
superiority of one group over the other.
To illustrate this phenomenon and the asymmetry of political
polarization in the specific United States context, it may be
helpful to consider a particularly salient example: the rise of
Donald Trump, a particularly polarizing figure. Across multiple
issues, including race and climate change, Republicans and
Democrats were fairly similar in 2004, but in 2014, the gap
became much wider (during the late Obama years; Pew Research
Center, 2014). During these years, the Republican party became
more and more polarized, with a clear division occurring
within the party- to the point where a new, more conservative
camp (the Tea Party) emerged (Arceneaux and Nicholson,
2012), eventually becoming the “voice” of the Republican party
(Blum, 2020). This camp defined itself through intergroup
interaction and intragroup interaction (obstructing Democrats
wherever possible instead of seeking compromise and talking
about “draining the swamp” of those who did not abide by
their more conservative values). These obstructionist tactics
resulted in further hostility and distrust between Republicans,
Democrats, and less conservative Republicans, which Donald
Trump capitalized on in his rise to power (Blum, 2020). Donald
Trump also capitalized on and engineered greater polarization
by being as divisive as possible within his own party; his main
message that America had lost its way because of attacks that
reduced Americans’ statuses resonated with voters. In fact, status
threat-fear that “we” (as Americans) were losing “our way” was
the single greatest contributing factor in predicting votes for
Donald Trump over everything else (Mutz, 2018). This example
suggests that this outcome of polarization as a sequence of events
following ideological conflict through division in camps does
have descriptive power, and we should consider how issue and
affective polarization play out together and separately.
Finally, research from communication and media studies
provides evidence that modern communication technologies act
as a catalyst for polarization primarily by facilitating intense
intragroup interaction – thus, validation and extremization
of group position in ‘echo-chambers (Wojcieszak, 2010, 2021;
Wojcieszak and Garrett, 2018), but also by making intergroup
conflict more salient through exposure to outgroup’s views (Han
and Federico, 2017; Wojcieszak et al., 2018, 2021). We discuss
in detail the evidence for both these pathways to polarization
later in the article.
In summary, as illustrated in Figure 1, polarization may be
represented as a continuous process that starts with dissent
between ideologically opposed camps when conflicting collective
narratives about social reality develop (ideological intergroup
conflict). As individuals start to identify with these conflicting
narratives within ideologically opposed camps, division between
these groups occurs and is accentuated by intragroup processes
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of validation and consensualisation (including in the online
domain in ‘echo-chambers’) and by intergroup processes of
exposure to the opposing position of the outgroup; polarization
in this case manifests as increasing psychological and ideological
distance (through increasing of outgroup stereotyping and
discrimination leading to outgroup hate and distrust, and
respectively, ideological positions becoming harder to reconcile).
Over time, growing ideological distancing can also lead to
radicalization of group beliefs – i.e., the group position becoming
increasingly extreme – in particular, when the ideological conflict
and subsequent polarization occurs between people in the
same group, as shown in research on intragroup conflict and
polarization (Groenendyk et al., 2020). However, while Figure 1
illustrates a theoretical pathway to polarization, it does not
mean that ideological conflict in society and identification with
opposed ideological camps is always resulting in polarization and
possibly radicalization – that is, there are alternative pathways
that can lead to unification and de-radicalization, as for example
when contextual changes create conditions for identification with
superordinate categories, for the need to achieve common goals
(e.g., climate change deniers and believers can unify to achieve
common goals such as clear water provisions, see Postmes, 2015)
or when a shared threat arises (Brewer, 1999).
RESEARCH ON POLARIZATION AS
EITHER ISSUE-DRIVEN OR AFFECTIVE
Issue-driven polarization (also known as ideological polarization,
Webster and Abramowitz, 2017) refers to the divisions formed
around policy positions or issues which are important in society
to a large section of the population (Duffy et al., 2019); it
is bi-modal, in the sense that it occurs around two distinct
positions, and support is clustered around either of these
positions. Increasingly, in the context of United States politics,
it has become apparent that polarization conceptualized (and
measured) as voters’ position does not fully capture current
partisan conflicts (Druckman and Levendusky, 2019). The
construct of affective polarization represents an extension of
the idea that polarization is the process whereby liberal and
conservative positions are divided across support and opposition
to various policy issues and positions toward these issues, and it is
reflected in the clustering of these positions toward the opposite
ends of the political spectrum. More than support and opposition
to these issues, polarization manifests in ‘affective terms’ as
intense dislike of the outgroup; it implies “sympathy to the in-
party and antipathy toward the out-party” (Abramowitz and
McCoy, 2019, p. 2, see also Huddy and Yair, 2021). In particular,
affective polarization “requires not only positive sentiment for
one’s own group, but also negative sentiment toward those
identifying with opposing groups” (Iyengar et al., 2012, p. 819;
see also, Klar et al., 2018). This highlights a novel development
in modern politics – partisan attitudes and behaviors might be
driven more by dislike of the outgroup rather than affinity for
the ingroup (i.e., the rise of negative partisanship reflected in ‘Us
versus Them’ divisions of the public, Abramowitz and McCoy,
2019). As noted by Iyengar et al. (2019):
Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those
from the other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that
the other party’s members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-
minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines.
This phenomenon of animosity between the parties is known as
affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2019, p. 129).
However, research on affective polarization has found that
while voters from the other party might be disliked to various
degrees, it is the political elites that are the most strongly disliked
and distrusted (Levendusky, 2018; Druckman and Levendusky,
2019). As way to measure affective polarization, several indicators
are generally used: (i) affective ratings – captured using survey
tools such as the ‘feeling thermometer rating’ (asking study
participants to rate how cold or warm they feel toward the
Democratic Party and the Republican Party, see Lelkes and
Westwood, 2017); (ii) trait ratings (of how well various traits
describe the parties) with positive traits including patriotism,
intelligence, honesty, open-mindedness, and generosity, and
negative traits including hypocrisy, selfishness, and meanness
(Iyengar et al., 2012; Garrett et al., 2014); and (iii) party trust
ratings (rating the extent to which participants trust the parties
to do what is right, Levendusky, 2013). Affective polarization also
incorporates the classic concept of ‘social distance’ introduced
by Bogardus in 1947 (Iyengar et al., 2012) which captured in
modern polarization measures by using questions about how
comfortable people are living in close proximity to members of
the outgroup (e.g., how comfortable people are in having close
friends from the other party, having neighbors from the other
party, and having their children marry someone from the other
party, see Iyengar et al., 2012; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016).
Furthermore, recent research on affective polarization in the
context of the current COVID-19 pandemic (Druckman et al.,
2020, 2021), shows that partisan animosity is predictive of both
attitudes toward the pandemic (i.e., participants’ concerns about
the virus, and support for policies aiming to limit the spread of
infection) and behaviors taken to limit the spread of infection,
suggesting that at least in the context of United States politics,
partisan animosity and issue-positions seem to be aligned and
polarized across the expected fault-lines.
Summary
Issue-driven polarization is primarily defined as divisions formed
around policy positions or issues that matter to social groups
within a society, with bimodal clustering around opposing
poles. However, this view is limited as research on issue-
driven polarization has shown that position alone does not
fully encompass current partisanship behavior and attitudes.
Meanwhile, affective polarization is largely the extent of intense
dislike for the opposing group, with a much more positive view
of the ingroup. The dislike is especially powerful, as it appears
more recent research suggests that negative affective polarization
(driven by dislike of the other group) might be more predictive
of partisan attitudes and behaviors than like of one’s own group.
Both these streams of research have shown significant shifts in
how polarization is developing and changing and considering a
new theoretical approach may be more descriptive and predictive
of polarization trends.
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POLARIZATION BETWEEN
IDEOLOGICALLY OPPOSED CAMPS
Scholars agree that there is increasing polarization in American
politics and beyond, but they are still debating about the ways
in which polarization can be best captured: by focusing on
relations between attitudes (as in issue polarization) or by
focusing on relations between people from opposing parties (as
in affective polarization) (Mason, 2016). There is recent evidence
that issue-driven and affective polarization may be connected.
In particular, it seems that attitudes toward policy issues (such
as social welfare, for example) have become increasingly aligned
with partisan identification (Webster and Abramowitz, 2017).
Similarly, attitudes on key issues in society such as climate
change seem to be divided across partisan lines and increasingly
consistent with partisan ideologies (McCright and Dunlap, 2011;
Dunlap et al., 2016). As partisan identities are evolving to become
increasingly aligned to other social identities (religious, racial,
ethnic, etc.), a process of convergence or ‘social sorting’ takes
place/unfolds (Mason, 2015, 2016; Davis and Dunaway, 2016).
That is, social sorting occurs “when religious, racial, and other
political movement identities grow increasingly linked to one
party or the other (. . .)” (Mason, 2016, p. 351). For example,
non-Hispanic white people and born-again Christians in the
United States make up a much larger share of Republicans
than Democrats (Egan, 2020). Not surprisingly, there is an
emerging trend in the field to treat polarization as interconnected
stages of the same process, rather than distinct constructs that
capture different processes (Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016). For
example, in recognizing the importance of ideology in the process
of polarization, Lelkes (2021) notes: “(. . .) elite polarization
and partisan sorting have driven Americans to see large policy
differences between their side and the other side (. . .), making
affective polarization a logical outcome.”
The Role of Collective Narratives in
Polarization
However, going beyond the ideas of interconnectedness and
continuity between issue-driven and affective polarization, a
comprehensive conceptualization of polarization must include
instances of polarization between groups defined by support
for issues that cut across political fault-lines. One example
of such groups is the anti-vaccination movement (Schmidt
et al., 2018) which includes both conservatives, who may be
primarily driven by religious values, and liberals, who may
be primarily driven by libertarian values (Rossen et al., 2019;
McCoy, 2020). Another example of polarization which is not fully
captured by partisan divides is the social movement for Scottish
independence, where for the 2014 referendum, supporters for
the independence (‘Yes’ movement supporters) were not only
drawn from the Scottish National Party (SNP), but also from
other parties such as the Liberal Democrats, Labor, and even
Conservatives (Dalzell, 2018).
While these movements are clearly issue-driven and
likely energized by ideological opposition (as in issue driven
polarization) and hostility toward the outgroup (as in affective
polarization), neither of these theoretical approaches can fully
explain polarization between anti-vaxxers and their opponents.
Nor can these approaches fully explain polarization between
‘Yes’ supporters and their opponents (‘unionists’). A theoretical
explanation that accounts for issue-driven polarization that cuts
across political partisan boundaries must start with the root of
the issue; thus, to understand polarization, we need to identify
the bases of groups that polarize – that is, the bases of ideologically
opposed camps. We propose that these bases are endorsement of
specific collective narratives about social reality. These narratives
are collective in the sense that they are shared between like-
minded others and collectively endorsed, and as such they may
provide bases for social identity formation (Bliuc et al., 2020b)
or unification of disparate but compatible identities under (as for
example, in the case of Brexit supporters who were drawn from
various pre-existing euro-skeptic groups). Such narratives are
central to understanding the psychology of polarization, because
they can help us understand the psychological processes that
drive individuals to identify with a collective cause and behave in
line with social norms that are prescribed by particular groups (as
per social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Importantly,
they provide individuals with meaning and structure through
rich, but cohesive stories that help them interpret social reality
in ways aligned to their moral values, pre-existing beliefs about
society (and the world more generally), and social identities
based on social categories (such as class, gender, profession,
etc.). Present and past social reality can always be explained or
interpreted through more than a single narrative, and in most
cases the available narratives include conflicting arguments that
often make these narratives mutually exclusive.
A clear illustration of the power of alternative and mutually
exclusive narratives to polarize the public is provided by the
2020 United States presidential elections. As the elections were
unfolding in November 2020, there were currently two dominant
narratives, both equally legitimate in the eyes of their respective
supporters, describing alternative realities that, in this case,
were mutually exclusive: in one version of reality the elections
were democratic and procedurally fair, resulting in Joe Biden
indisputably winning the elections, while the other version
presented a completely different reality where the elections were
compromised by unlawful interference and corruption, with Joe
Biden’s win being strongly contested. Similarly, climate change
deniers identify themselves as skeptics (Bliuc et al., 2015; Fielding
and Hornsey, 2016) and have strong group identities which are
based on a particular narrative about a social reality where, for
instance, global warming is not caused by human action. Climate
change deniers define their identity in an oppositional manner to
‘climate change believers’ and they are driven in their behaviors
by emotions, moral values, and norms which are aligned to their
group identity (Bliuc et al., 2015).
Within a person, any number of collective narratives may
converge and together contribute to a personal narrative that
makes people who they are as unique individuals. A personal
narrative would include elements which are unique to the
individual (e.g., perceptions of personal traits and experiences),
but also collective narratives with varying degrees of centrality
to self-definition that contribute to self-concept – that is, the
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self-concept can be seen as incorporating many roles that are
represented as social categories (Markus, 1977; Turner, 1985;
Turner and Reynolds, 2010) – e.g., as a parent, party member,
citizen of a particular country, etc., but also endorsement of
specific narratives that provide information about what a person
is ready to stand for relative to other people in society (McGarty
et al., 2009). Returning to the context of polarization, collective
narratives are particularly important because they embed specific
(collectively shared) moral values, beliefs, and norms that shape
attitudes toward the outgroup and guide individual behaviors
and collective actions. That is, collective narratives inform the
content (values, norms, and behaviors) of the respective social
identities that develop from support of these narratives. A recent
illustration of research on polarization between ideologically
opposed camps that also conceptually integrates issue-driven
and affective polarization is provided by a study of polarization
around Brexit in the United Kingdom (Hobolt et al., 2020). In this
work, the construct of polarization is extended by investigating
polarization between groups based on their position toward
Brexit (i.e., supporters of the Leave versus supporters of the
Remain campaign), in addition to partisan affective polarization.
Data from United Kingdom participants placed at both sides
of the divide shows that social identities based on ideological
positions toward Brexit were more relevant than partisan
identification: Brexit identities were considered personally more
important by the participants, and they generated affective
polarization as intense as it would be expected from partisan
divisions, as indicated by increases in prejudice, stereotyping and
other indicators of negative intergroup attitudes.
In some cases, collective narratives may take over social
identities based on social categories such as national identity
(so that a social identity can be fully expressed as support
and enactment of a particular narrative). The best illustration
of such cases is when national identities become dominated
by collective narratives about identity and the meaning of key
historical events are based on interpretations, not shared by
the whole nation. For example, research on national identity,
shows that in the context of Australia, intergroup conflict
driven by contrasting narratives about what it means to be an
Australian may divide the community into supporters versus
opponents of multiculturalism; these collective narratives provide
opposing definitions of the Australian identity and opposing
arguments (with associated beliefs, values, and norms) about
what social identification as an Australian entails (Bliuc et al.,
2012). Similarly, dissent about narratives incorporating the
meaning of historical events currently celebrated during the
Australian national day (and the legitimacy of this celebration)
divides the Australian community into supporters and opponents
of “Change the date” – a campaign supporting changing the
current date for celebrating Australia day from January 26, a
date signifying the arrival of British colonizers and the beginning
of modern Australia (but at the same time the start of a
dark historical period from the perspective of the Indigenous
population) to a date that could be equally celebrated by
Indigenous Australians (Bliuc et al., 2020b, 2021). Similarly, in
the context of intractable conflict, alternative narratives about
past suffering, guilt, and justice further polarize citizens of nations
such as Israel and Rwanda (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998; Bar-Tal
et al., 2014; Moss, 2014).
However, because collective narratives can evolve and change,
the social identity content of ideologically opposed camps is
also fluid implying that polarization between different camps
and outgroup hate are not universal outcomes. Narratives about
national identity for instance can change to incorporate unifying
values and norms and therefore providing a platform for camps
to expand and unify. We have seen this recently in relation to
England’s football team in the EURO 2020 through the deliberate
messages of anti-racism, promoting an inclusive, unifying version
of what it means to be English (Smith, 2021). Similarly, instances
of unifying collective narratives are seen in the Black Lives
Matters and MeToo movements which bring together people
from different social categories (across ethnic boundaries and
respectively gender categories). Therefore, a collective narrative
approach to polarization incorporates potential solutions to
decrease or even reverse polarization – it is only when there
are no alternative unifying narratives available that polarization
between camps represents the unavoidable outcome.
Summary
A collective narrative approach to polarization appears to have
several advantages over accounts that distinguish between issue-
driven and affective polarization. This approach suggests that
by considering the social psychology of collective narratives,
we can better understand the bases of relevant social identities,
which then links to and bridges the affective and issue-driven
approaches to polarization. The collective narrative around
issues within a social identity can drive group formation and
polarization between groups as one’s social identity based on one’s
ideological position may be the root of the process. Furthermore,
collective narratives contain values, beliefs, and norms that affect
intergroup attitudes (they provide the why polarization may
occur). This collective narrative approach can, therefore, predict
group formation and intragroup dynamics on the basis of issues
that ingroup members agree in (intragroup consensus), and
predict intergroup behavior by evaluating the content of the
values and norms embedded within these collective narratives in
these social groups (driven by intergroup dissent).
THE ROLE OF ONLINE MEDIA IN THE
POLARIZATION OF IDEOLOGICALLY
OPPOSED CAMPS
Collective narratives about various socio-political issues or
aspects of social reality can emerge through any medium
where human interaction is possible, but polarization appears
to be accelerated through online interaction. Communication
via online media has recently become a more potent method
of polarization with much wider effects than other forms of
media and understanding how online media is different to other
modes of communication may aid in explaining increased rates
of polarization in recent years. Online environments may affect
the likelihood of polarization through their influence on the
pace and quality of the transformation of collective narratives
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in ideologically opposed camps (when they are communicating
online). Recent theoretical developments from communication
and media studies suggest that transformative political behavior
might be undermined by the ‘chaotic pluralism’ driving a myriad
of online micro-actions (‘tiny acts’ of political participation)
such as sharing, liking, donating small amounts for various
causes, and so, which while they create turbulence, their impact
on decision-makers may be limited (Margetts, 2016; Margetts
et al., 2016). These behaviors are seen to be underpinned by
complex non-linear dynamics and randomness, so are likely
harder to model and predict; however, even in these highly
complex (online) environments, we know from research based
on the social identity of deindividuation effects (SIDE, Reicher
et al., 1995; see also Klein et al., 2007) that even small behaviors
in these contexts are still driven by salient social identities. Thus,
in a sense, our approach to understand the ‘us versus them’
dynamics of polarization as driven by competing, ideologically
driven social identities can offer solutions to modeling and
predicting the potential impact of seemingly disparate political
micro-actions online.
In online media, people can engage with a wider range both
like-minded others and people who support opposing narratives
than ‘in real life,’ while outside of the digital world, people
spend time within relatively homogenous groups, marrying and
befriending people within these very same groups (Kalmijn and
Flap, 2001; Alves et al., 2016; Luo, 2017). By contrast to the
offline contexts, online media provides a rich platform for the
development of and refinement of various collective narratives
online. By facilitating social interaction, and therefore, the
processes of deliberation, mutual validation, consensualisation,
and endorsement of arguments and overall narratives, these
processes contribute to add nuance and complexity to narratives.
There are three key factors that enable this in the online world.
First, it is easier to communicate and connect with like-minded
others online, as often (ideologically driven) virtual communities
are brought together by consensus or support for a particular
narrative about social reality over others. Unfortunately, this
often acts as a method of validating fringe beliefs through
social proof, but it also provides the proverbial glue that holds
these groups together (Code and Zaparyniuk, 2010; Eddington,
2018; Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir, 2020). Second, online public
spaces have low barriers for entry with a much larger reach,
whereas offline public spaces have higher barriers for reaching
a larger number of people (usually through established methods
of mail, loudspeakers, events, etc.). Thirdly, near anonymity
allows and in the case of some online platforms, encourages
(e.g., sites/apps like Whisper; see Asenbaum, 2018; Mondal et al.,
2020) – people to voice opinions that may otherwise invite social
drawbacks in offline settings. Together, these factors suggest
online environments are unique in their characteristics, and these
characteristics may affect polarization.
When ideologically driven online communities first emerged
(especially around hate speech), commentators often dismissed
their impact as illusionary groups or spoke about them in abstract
terms (Gosnell, 1997), partially because of the limited exposure of
the internet amongst these commentators and partially because
of the lack of effective internet penetration at the time. However,
more recently online media has demonstrated to be far more
powerful in polarization than even more recent commentators
believed, as the internet has become ubiquitous (especially as a
consequence of the current global need for social distancing to
prevent COVID-19’s spread), and online polarization has real life
consequences. For example, Cambridge Analytica successfully
used online media to help polarize opinion of voters from
opposing sides toward more extreme views, swaying elections in
multiple countries, including India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and
Trinidad and Tobago (González et al., 2019). During COVID-19,
anti-maskers became a vocal group online, and organized rallies,
causing significant public health crises in a number of countries
(Jamison et al., 2020; Pleyers, 2020). Black Lives Matter protestors
successfully hijacked the use of the hashtag #alllivesmatter and
used the counter hashtags of #blacklivesmatter as a way to
mobilize support by framing it as a counterprotest (Gallagher
et al., 2018). These actions would largely not be possible offline, as
the level of organization and reach to mobilize these events would
be limited by cost and time.
While much of the research on polarization has focused on
western democracies and the increase in polarization between
liberal and conservative groups, these patterns of polarization
also exist in the rest of the world, driven by the online
environment. However, polarization in these countries do
not always reflect traditional “liberal” versus “conservative,”
suggesting that online polarization does not only magnify this
divide, but other differences as well. For example, Malaysia’s
increasing polarization caused a collapse of the secular ruling
party in March 2020 (Saravanamuttu, 2021). The ruling party
Pakatan Harapan (PH) was an inclusive, multi-ethnic collation,
but online campaigns resulted in successfully sowing division
between and within camps leading the government’s collapse.
In Kenya, polarization occurred against ethnic lines, rather than
issues; this was stoked by Whatsapp messages shared by the
population (Kibet and Ward, 2018). In Turkey, limited evidence
suggests that online polarization follows a pattern of support
for secularism versus autocratic religiousness (Kutlu, 2021). This
pattern of online-driven polarization appears to be similar across
the globe, with one analysis suggesting that polarization is much
stronger now than at any point in the past 100 years— largely due
to the internet (Carothers and O’Donohue, 2019).
Therefore, understanding how online environments can affect
polarization is not only critical in the current context, but also
provides a powerful illustration of our theoretical argument: in
societies divided across the fault-lines of ideological conflict,
groups based on consensus about and support for a particular
collective narrative over others (ideologically opposed camps)
give isolated individuals a platform to form common cause
with like-minded others and through communication (online
social interaction) endorse and further refine these narratives.
As group members, these individuals’ behaviors would be
shaped by collective values, beliefs, and norms aligned to these
narratives – resulting in increasing polarization as animosity and
hostility toward the outgroup, and distancing (ideological and
psychological) from the outgroup. As stated earlier, according
to our argument, polarization in ideologically opposed groups
is both issue-driven and leading to affective polarization. Online
groups, which can be categorized as ideologically opposed
camps by their nature, are issue-driven in their formation, and
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we because of the rich digital footprint they leave, provide
opportunities to study more comprehensively both intergroup
and intra-group polarization by examining the content of these
groups over time. Furthermore, we can observe the increased
ideological and psychological distancing as these groups interact
with opposing others. Using our framework, we review evidence
on how online environments can increase the pace and severity of
polarization through increasing the likelihood of intragroup and
intergroup contact.
Online Social Interaction With
Ideologically Similar Others
(Intra-Group) – Effects on Polarization
Online collective narratives help inform social identity content,
in the sense that we rely on what others say and do to develop
a shared understanding of the world. However, classic social
psychological studies refer to group polarization as a process by
which group members become more extreme after interacting
with fellow group members (Myers and Bishop, 1970; Lamm
and Myers, 1978; Isenberg, 1986), and an online environment
may serve to accelerate this intra-group polarization process.
This effect is likely magnified in an online environment for
three reasons: first, it provides opportunities above that of “real
life” as there are more opinions and social proof for even
marginal opinions, and second the systems (i.e., technology
and algorithms) involved with online social media are designed
to optimize engagement (which they can do by presenting
information that corresponds with or relates to a person’s
worldview). Accordingly, the diversity of online ideologically
opposed camps tends to be far larger than in real life. Third,
early research also suggests that the anonymity (afforded by
online social interaction) increases intra-group polarization
effects (Spears et al., 1990; Lee, 2007) – a finding later confirmed
by research on the effects of echo-chambers in polarization
(Flaxman et al., 2016; Quattrociocchi et al., 2016; Del Vicario
et al., 2017).
Social media sites may tend to present a wide variety of
viewpoints in the direction of polarization for the user (Park and
Kaye, 2017) rather than ideologically oppositional content, as the
ruling algorithms tend to prioritize presenting content that the
user has shown interest in past interactions (Willson, 2014). One
particularly large study on American Facebook users (N > 10
million) found that Facebook tended not to show much “cross
cutting” content (i.e., content that challenged a user’s worldview),
partially because of algorithms designed to increase engagement,
but mostly because people tend to be friends with those who
share similar viewpoints (Bakshy et al., 2015). Similar results were
found with Twitter users (Himelboim et al., 2013). This leads to
the majority of content on social media—the primary way people
socially engage with the internet— fitting one’s perspective of
the world. Similar research on YouTube users (N > 12 million)
found that people online tended to consume content that fit
their perspective (Bessi et al., 2016). Furthermore, examination
of YouTube’s algorithm suggests that it tends to show more
extremist content upon consumption of one extreme video to the
point where complete immersion in extremist content is possible
by following the suggested videos (O’Callaghan et al., 2015).
Therefore, social media may serve to present more viewpoints
that would be considered extreme (or polarized) in one direction.
Multiple recent studies suggest, in the context of these
algorithms, online interaction with like-minded others increases
polarization, possibly more than interacting with others in
traditional (i.e., analog) means. On Reddit, membership in some
political subsites (known as subreddits) also seems associated
with polarization of opinions, as they frequently link to other
extreme subreddits [e.g., Reddit’s conservative subreddit often
linked to WhiteRights, a white supremacist section (Soliman
et al., 2019)]. Another temporal analysis on thousands of
abortion tweets suggested that online interaction with likeminded
individuals tends to strengthen their group identity and
viewpoint— especially as they were exposed to more diverse
viewpoints from before (Yardi and Boyd, 2010). Therefore,
online environments likely increase intragroup polarization,
probably by presenting more diverse views within the ideological
boundaries of the group (views that fit one’s perspective).
Online Social Interaction With
Ideologically Opposed Others
(Inter-Group) – Effects on Polarization
Inter-group polarization seems similarly accelerated by the
online environment, due to the same reasons underpinning the
acceleration of intra-group polarization. It has been established
that online systems can have an incentive to decrease social
interaction with content that opposes one’s initial stance, but
they do still allow users to interact with people outside of
one’s ideological camp (e.g., via the comment section of a
news article or blog). In fact, there is evidence showing
that intergroup exchanges of information are more frequent
in online media than initially thought (Barberá et al., 2015;
Tucker et al., 2018; Barberá, 2020). This may happen because
of the increased exposure to information from weak ties
(relatives, co-workers, acquaintances, etc.) which are more likely
to spread ideologically diverse information (Barberá, 2014,
2020). Theoretically, exposure to content that contradicts one’s
worldview would lead to less polarized (moderated) views; well-
established research on intergroup contact amongst ideologically
intolerant people outside the digital world suggests moderation
of their views as an outcome (Hodson, 2011). However, this
does not appear to be the case online. Intriguingly, algorithms
designed to increase virality have an incentive to provide content
that increase anger, as research has demonstrated that online
content that makes people angry is far more likely to be spread
and shared (Berger and Milkman, 2009). This suggests there is an
incentive for systems to both present information that fits one’s
initial stance, but also at least some information that counters
one’s worldview to increase engagement. A natural consequence
of this may be that people online from one ideological stance are
exposed more frequently to cross-cutting stories and comments
that make people angry due to contrast with their ideological
stance; here, we review research on how intergroup polarization
is affected by the online environment.
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While direct contact with ideologically opposed others in
real life can serve to reduce (Hodson, 2011) or increase
polarization (Paluck, 2010), as stated earlier, the research into
online interaction suggests a starker view: online interactions
with others seem to largely galvanize more extreme views,
possibly due to a stronger awareness of political or ideologically
driven identities in social media interactions (Settle, 2018).
For example, one Twitter based study showed that during the
2016 presidential debates, polarization increased dramatically
afterward as a result of exposure to intergroup contact (Primario
et al., 2017). Another Twitter-based experiment found that
Republicans (N = 751) expressed more conservative views after
being paid to follow a left-leaning Twitter bot compared to a
control group, presenting experimental evidence that exposure
to intergroup views increases polarization (Bail et al., 2018).
Similarly, direct dissent with a comment on a YouTube video
relating to changing the date on Australia day in previously
mentioned research (Bliuc et al., 2020b) drove polarization. These
studies suggest that viewing information that contrasts with one’s
world view increased polarization as a form of intergroup contact.
There is a possibility that some groups become more polarized
through intergroup contact, while others tend to become more
polarized through intragroup contact, or in some cases, both.
In an earlier cited experimental study (Bail et al., 2018) paying
participants to follow a contrarian twitter bot, the researchers
attempted to perform the same experiment with an otherwise
similar sample of Democrats (N = 908), but found it was
insignificant in predicting polarization. In a Facebook based
Brexit study (N > 1.5 million), the main driver for polarization
for Remainers appeared to be echo-chambers, where there was
little cross cutting. Meanwhile, Brexiters tended to frequently
engage with ideological adversaries (Bossetta et al., 2018). The
difference here may be due to the difference in collective
narratives and therefore, social identity content; in some groups,
being adversarial may be part of the norm, while others may focus
more on intragroup cohesion.
Summary
Overall, the argument that polarization is amplified by online
conditions is empirically supported by research. Online forums
and sites increase intragroup polarization; views within groups
become more extreme as sites tend to provide more opportunities
with engagement with like-minded others while also presenting
information popular within that community (which only leads
to more polarization). Meanwhile, online environments also
increase the chances of intergroup polarization because of
the diversity and strength of the opinions being expressed.
Therefore, online environments increase polarization through
social identity and group-based processes, mostly by scaling
up opportunities for intragroup polarization and enhancing
intergroup polarization through the medium’s own parameters.
DISCUSSION
Democratic societies have a lot to lose because of the growing
polarization. While diversity in opinions and ideologies is a
sign of a healthy democracy, increasing polarization about
issues that are important for the society and individual (Liu
and Latané, 1998) is concerning. In particular, at the level of
society, polarization manifests as escalating intergroup conflict
that in turns results in increasing fragmentation (i.e., social
and psychological distancing between members of ideologically
opposing camps). At an interpersonal level, polarization
translates into increased antipathy and hostility toward members
of the outgroup. While these direct effects of polarization are
well documented in the literature on issue-driven and affective
polarization, there are potential indirect impacts on society: for
instance, increased fragmentation of nations and communities
provides a clear pathway to alienation (including self-alienation)
of subgroups and therefore provides potential pathways to
radicalization (Blackwood et al., 2012; Bélanger et al., 2019).
That is, polarization can be understood as an initial step in the
process of extremization of collective narratives, which in turn
can transform groups into platforms for radicalization to political
violence (Smith et al., 2020). Even when polarization does not
lead to such drastic effects, it does have long-term ramifications
affecting the ability of communities to work cooperatively toward
superordinate goals that would not only be beneficial for specific
groups or even nations, but for the humanity as a whole (e.g.,
eradicating child poverty, achieving generalized social justice, and
reducing carbon emissions).
In this review, we integrate conceptualizations of issue-
driven polarization (focusing on the roots of polarization)
with conceptualizations of affective polarization (focusing on
intergroup and interpersonal manifestations of polarization), by
proposing that polarization can be understood as a process of
increased animosity and ideological and psychological distancing
between ideologically opposed camps. We highlight the role
of ideologically opposed camps – that is, psychological groups
formed around support for a particular collective narrative about
social reality (Bliuc et al., 2020b, 2021) – in the process of
polarization. The interplay between collective consensus and
dissent is key in understanding how ideologically opposed camps
form: it is consensus that brings like-minded people together
to share a collective social identity (identify as supporters of a
particular ideological camp), but it is dissent with an opposing
side that makes group formation possible in the first place and
provided the group with a common cause (something to fight
for), therefore keeping the group together and maintaining the
intergroup conflict. The collective narratives that underpin these
groups are embedded with values, beliefs, and norms, and their
transformation (through social interaction and communication)
can help us better understand and even predict changes in the
actions of polarized group members.
Our re-conceptualization of polarization is placed in the
contemporary context where social interaction is dominated
by online communication technologies. We show how the
process of polarization is amplified by online media through
enabling ready accessibility and wider reach to communication
with both ingroup and outgroup members. Increasingly, studies
show that online communication both with like-minded others
(members of the same camp) and with supporters of oppositional
views (members of the ideologically opposed camp) leads to
heighten polarization between groups. This trend is particularly
worrying when the polarizing groups include already extreme
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communities such as far-right and neo-Nazi forums (Wojcieszak,
2010; O’Callaghan et al., 2015; Bliuc et al., 2019, 2020a) where
further polarization and radicalization can result in acts of
political violence being committed against members of cultural
or religious minorities (as exemplified by the 2019 mosque attacks
in Christchurch, New Zealand, where the perpetrator was at least
partly radicalized online).
Future Directions
The proposed theoretical approach on polarization provides new
avenues for research. By consolidating research from political
science, psychology, and communication, future research can
establish whether we can predict when polarization is likely to
occur both online and offline, and because recent advances on
the use of online tools for academic research (and access to
enormous amounts of online social interaction data – including
on historical interactions), we can track polarization in real time
against this framework.
To refine our current understanding of the link between
online polarization and offline events, further research should
consider using Twitter hashtags in response to a global event
and examine a network of tweets against a social identity map
(Bentley et al., 2020). This will serve as a test of hypotheses
derived from our conceptualization of polarization as stemming
from dissent on alternative collective narratives. In particular,
the formation of identities online can be studied as well as
the effects of identification with ideologically opposed camps.
Future studies can establish whether the formation of a social
identity organically arises from issue-based perspectives, and
whether the content of the narrative predicts emotional responses
from opposing camps. Because this research also uses social
psychology research to understand polarization, it can also
use social psychological research methods to test predictions
on what would work to reduce polarization. There is some
early experimental (online) evidence that suggests that making
non-issue driven identities salient (such as shared identities as
Americans) may reduce partisanship (Levendusky, 2018). The
social identity approach also suggests that recategorization has
utility in reducing perceived intergroup differences; for example,
asking individuals to think of themselves as a member of
multiple groups reduces salient differences, potentially reducing
more extreme outgroup beliefs (Prati et al., 2016). Therefore,
getting social groups to refocus on different collective narratives
embedded in different social identities may serve to reduce
polarization as well.
Another area of research that requires further examination
is the different patterns of polarization in different groups. As
stated earlier, research on Brexit online found that Remainers
and Leavers differed in their intergroup and intragroup behaviors
(Bossetta et al., 2018), while Democrats were less likely to show
polarization than Republicans in response to a contrarian Twitter
bot (Bail et al., 2018). Together, these suggest that some collective
identities may have been energized by different narratives that
then lead to different patterns of polarization. We observe
that more right-wing groups tended to engage with intergroup
members and were more likely to be polarized, suggesting
that there may be a narrative around being oppositional or
reaching out that drives greater polarization in some groups and
not others, while other groups may have a narrative around
“looking within” to cause more polarization. Alternatively, it
may be that some groups on one pole tend to attract certain
types of individuals who believe in narratives around outreach
(framing themselves as opposition), while others believe in
narratives around intra-group cohesiveness (framing themselves
from within group discussion). The difference between these
hypotheses is that the former hypothesis is around the narrative
that drives member behavior, while the latter suggests that the
members attracted to certain narratives tend to behave in a
different way. Measuring these values and member behavior
before and after being part of a group may provide clarity on how
collective narratives link to polarization, and therefore, can act to
refine the model presented in this paper.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we present evidence that a collective narrative-
based approach to understanding polarization has advantages
over previous approaches (that distinguish between polarization
as issue driven or affective), as they are more descriptive of
current polarization trends. We argue that polarization is most
likely to occur when ideological conflicts are salient in society,
as this fosters the formation of ideologically opposed camps
which by their nature are prone to polarizing. Under this
argument, there are two components that lead to polarization:
when groups form around support for a particular narrative
about social reality, and when this group exists in opposition to
alternative viewpoints (e.g., Leavers and Remainers for Brexit).
We term these ideologically opposed camps, based on support
for a particular narrative, but we also suggest that these collective
narratives diverge and can transform further as a consequence
of intergroup and intragroup processes, thereby consolidating
affective and issue driven polarization approaches and at the same
time providing a potential pathway to radicalization. Applying
this approach to current polarization trends, we examined
evidence on contemporary conflicts and online polarization
trends, finding that such a collective narrative approach can
describe the increased polarization seen in modern politics.
Further research into this theoretical paradigm may help develop
interventions to reduce extreme polarization across fractured
political fault lines, thereby improving democratic processes and
social relations between people of varying opinions and beliefs.
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